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PEOPLE

[Crim. No. 6335.

v.

DEWBERRY

[51 C.2d

In Bank. Feb. 6, 1959.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN DEWBERRY,
.
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Second Degree Murder.-A conviction
of second degree murder was supported by the testimony of
an eyewitness that defendant, who had for some time been
gambling and dl'inking in a bar, told the bartender that
he wished to take care of his bill, spread his roll of money on
the bar, accused the deceased of taking his money and demanded its return, that the deceased stated he was not taking
defendant's money but merely keeping it for him to protect
him, that in the course of the ensuing argument (during
which defendant said he did not need the deceased's protection but had his own protection) the witness saw the deceased put his hand in his pocket and pass something over to
his wife, that defendant told the deceased's wife to put his
money on the bar, repeated his demand to the deceased, took
out his revolver and shot the deceased, and that the witness
did not hear the deceased threaten defendant or make a move
toward him, since the jury could reasonably conclude from
such testimony that defendant shot the deceased without the
provocation necessary to make the homicide manslaughter or
the deliberation and premeditation necessary to make it first
degree murder.
[2] Oriminal Law-Instructions - Witnesses - Oredibility.-In a
prosecution for murder and for unlawfully carrying a weapon,
it was not error to refuse an instruction that the fact that a
witness had been convicted of a felony may be considered by
the jury "for only one purpose, namely, in judging the credibility of that witness," where other instructions that it was
for the jury alone to judge the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be ginn the evidence offered, that every person
is presumed to speak the truth, and that a witness may be impeached by inconsistent statements, by contradictory evidence
or by evidence that he had been convicted of a felony, correctly stated the law, and where the requested instruction !
was incorrect in that defendant's convictions were not in evidence for the quoted purpose only, but were an essential element in the charged violation of the Deadly Weapons Act.
(Pen. Code, § 12021.)
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 146; [2] CdlJlinul Law,
§834; [3] Criminal Lnw, §912; [4-6] Criminal I.nw, §58~(]);
[7] Homicide, § 182; [8] Criminnl Law, § 1437 (9) j [9] Homicide,
§ 229.
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[3] Id.-Inntructlons-Right. to Convict of Lesser Offenses.-W~en
the evidence is suffid(,lIt to support. ft finding of guilt of both
the offense charged IIno a lesser included offense, the JUTy must
be instructed that if they entertain a reRsonable doubt as to
which offense has been committed they must find defendant
guilty only of the lesser offense.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt-Doubt as to Degree of
Offense.-Pen. Code, § 1097, providing that "Where it appears
that defendant has committed a public offense, and there is
rcasonnble ground of doubt of which of two or more offenses
he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only," presupposes that the jury has concluded that defendant is guilty of some public offense embraced within the
pleadings but is in doubt as to the degree of the offense proved.
The words "offense" and "degrees," as used therein, refer to
all the degrees of criminality involved in a criminal act, not
only to the specifically defined degrees of a single offense, so
that an unlnwful killing may involve not only the two degrees
of murder, but also the included offense of manslaughter.
[5] Id.-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt.-In every case the principle of reasonable doubt requires an acquittal of an offense
when the prosecution has not met its burden of proof.
[6] Id.-Evidence-Reasona.ble Doubt.-Where reasonable doubt
exists as between degrees of the same offense or as between
the inclusive and included offense, the jury can only convict of
the crime whose elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[7] Homicide-Instructions-Degrees of Offense-Conviction of
Included Offenses.-In a proposed instruction in a homicide
ease that if the jury "entertained a reasonable doubt as to the
degree of the crime of which [defendant] is guilty, it is your
duty to convict him only of the lesser offense," "degrec of the
crime" refers, not to the degrees of murder alone, but to degrees of eriminal homicide including manslaughter, and ''lesser
offenses" refers to the lesser of the two degrees of criminal
homicide between which the doubt exists; the instruction thus
mnkes clear that the principle of reasonable doubt applies not
only between first and second degree murder but also between
second degree murder and mnnslaughter.
[Sa, Sb] Oriminal Law-Appea.l-Harmless and Reversible ErrorInstructions.-In a prosecution for murder and for unlawfully
carrying n weapon, the court's fnilure to instruct on tbe effect
of a reasonable doubt as between any of the included offenses,
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[3] See Am.Jur., Trilll, § 790.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 112; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1256.
[7] See Am.Jur., Homicide, § 541.
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when it had instructed as to the effect of such doubt as between tbe two higbe5t offenses and as between the lowest offensc lind justifiable homicidc, lcft the instructions with the
clearly erroneous implication that the rule requiring a finding·
of guilt of the lesser offense applied only as between first and
f;ecpnd degrec murder, and where thc case was a dose one on
the facts and, though there was sufficient evidence to support
a conviction or second degree murder, a. finding thnt the offense was m3nslauZhter would be equally warranted; tIle error
was prejudicial insofar as the conviction of second degree
murder was concerned, but had no bearing on defendant's
conviction of unlawfully cnrrying a weapon.
[9] Bomicide-Instructions-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt.-In a
murder prosecution, where there was evidence that deceased
had taken defendant's money in a bar and only returned part
of it, passing the rest to his wife, and defendant testified that
deceased made a menacing gesture toward him and told him
that if he did not shut up ]le would lose more than his money,
defendant was entitled to have this evidence considered in the
light of the rule of reasonflble doubt, not only on the issue of
self-defense, but also on the issue of provocation sufficient to
reduce the killing from second degree murder to manslaughter,
and it was error not to give nn instruction as to the defense
of reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt of second degree
murder, sinee it was elenrly responsive to an issue raised by
the evidence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying
a new trial. Walter Carpeneti, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Prosecution for murder and for unlawfully carrying a
weapon. Judgment of conviction reversed as to conviction of
second degree murder on count charging murder, and affirmed
as to conviction of possession of a pistol by an ex-convict on
the other count.
Gladstein, Andersen, Leonard & Sibbett, George R. Andersen and Norman Leonard for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clari'l1(·e A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and John S. Mdllerny, Deputy
At torney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Dcf\'lIJanl appeals from a judgment of
convictioll entered Oil a jur~· ver,lid finding him guilty of
second degrt'c murder and of a violation of section 120:'U of

)

}~cb.

1959] .

PEOPJ,E tJ. DEWBERRY
151 C.2d 548; 334 P .2d 852]

551

tIle Peual Code (possession of a pistol by an ex-convict). He
also appeals from the order denying his motion for a new
trial. He ('ontends that the evidence is insufficil'nt to support
the verdict alld that the refusal to give certain rcquested inst.ructions was prejudicial error.
The circumstances of the homicide were relatl'd at the trial
by two witnesses, Jesse Mosley and defendant. Mosley testified that about 7 :30 a.m. on Sunday, October 14, 1956, hc
went toa bar in San Francisco. He sat near the door and
consumed two bourbon highballs. He had been in the bar
about 45 minutes when defendant entered and sat about 10
feet from him. )Iosley did not know defendant, but had seen
him before and had heard his name. Defendant went to the
telephone several times and complained about not being able
to reach his sister.
In the course of a conversation about gambling between
defendant and another customer defendant took a large roll
of bills from his pocket. The two agreed to gamble and defendant stated that he did not want any foolishness about his
money and that he carried his own protection. He then showed
the revolver he was carrying. Defendant repocketed the
pistol and the two left the bar. A short time later, defendant returned.
The deceased, Rudolf Glover, entered the bar at about 9
a.m. with a woman whom he introduced as his wife to Mosley
and the others. Glover and defendant each bought a round of
drinks for the six or seven other customers.
About 10 :45 a.m. the television set was turned on for a
Forty-Niner football game. Mosley moved to a booth in the
rear to see better. About this time defendant told the bartender he wished to take care of his bill and spread his roll
of money on the bar.
A few minutes later, two people Bat in front of Mosley and
blocked his view of the screen, so he started back to his original
seat. As he was walking toward the front of the bar he heard
defendant accuse Glover of taking his money and demand its
return. Glover stated that he was not taking defendant's
money but merl'Iy keeping it for him to protect him" Defendant told Glover that be did not need JJis protection, that he
had Ilis own protection. Both defendant and Glover were
stmuling, about tIlTf'f' hal' stuols or 10 ff't't apart. Df'ft'ndant
again tlelJlllIHl('d HIIlt. Gl()w~r retnrll the money.
In the course of the argument, Mosley saw Glover put his
hand in his pocket and pass something to Mrs. Glover. De-
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fendant then told Mrs. Glover to put his money on the bar
and repcated hill dcmand to Glover. Thereupon defelldHllt
took out his revolver, cocked it, and fired oncc. Glovcr turned
aild fell. At no time did Mosley hear Glover thrcaten defendant or sec him make a move toward defendaut .
. Defcndant turned Glover over and went through his
pockets. Mrs. Glover began to cry as she put her head on
Glover's chest. She then started for thc door, but defendant
asked her for the rest of his money. When she failed to give
it to him, he hit her in the face, knocking her down. He
pointed the pistol at her and said, "If you don't give me my
money I will kill you too." Mosley took the money from Mrs.
Glover. Defendant had the bartender count it for him and
when he was told the amount he stated that he was still
about $100 short.
Meanwhile, someone had called an ambulance and the
police. Officer Dobleman testified that when he 81'rived at
the bar, defendant handed him a .38 caliber revolver with
five live rounds and one discharged shell in thc cylinder. Defendant told the officer, "He tried to take my money and
I did it." Shortly thereafter defendant made substantially
the same statement to Inllpector McDonald of the homicide
detail. It appeared to the officers that at the time he was
questioned defendant had been drinking but was in full
control of his faculties and had no trouble speaking.
Defendant testified that he was a professional gambler and
a car salesman and admitted two prior felony convictions.
He had spent the previous night drinking and gamhling in
San Mateo, had met a friend in San Francisco about 5 a.m.,
had a few more drinks, and went to the bar about 8 a.m. He
was waiting there to get in touch with his sister to give hcr
money for the care of his mother. While he was waiting, he
talked to another customer about gambling, but he denied
showing him the pisto1. He went upstairs and gambled with
11im for about 45 minutes and won $55.
When he returned to the bar, he had a brief conversation
with the bartender about his bar bill. He paid it and then
lipread his money out along the bar so that he could arrange
it according to denomination. He kncw he had $1,252. While
hc was sorting and arranging the money, Mrs. Glover told him
to take it off the bar. Defendant told hE'r to millu her own
business and slle walked awa~·. GJovE'r t111'1J walked to till' har
and picked up the DlOney. Dcfenollut IIt(lppetl llim lind as}{ed
him to return it. GIonr put some money hack on the bar, but
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ilerendant could sef' t.hat. five $100 hills werc missing. At de·
fendant's request, the bartender counted the money and found
about $700. After defendant's repeated demands for the
return of his money, Glover reached in his pocket and raised
his arm toward defendant. Glover had told defendant that
if he did not shut up he would lose more than his money. One
James McCoy had told him that the deceased had a reputation
of being belligerent. Defendant said he tried to fire the pistol
to the right of Glover, but with no intention to hit him. He
had won the weapon in the game in San Mateo and was not
sure it was loaded until he pulled the trigger. He denied
threatening Mrs. Glover.
The testimony of the autopsy surgeon tended to corroborate
defendant's story about Glover's raising his arm toward
defendant. James McCoy, called by the People in rebuttal,
denied telling defendant anything about Glover.
[1] There is no merit in defendant's contention that the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of seconddegree murder. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187.) Such
malice may be express or implied. It is express when there
is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away
the life of a fellow-creature. It is implied, when no considerable pro,'ocation appears, or when the circumstances attending
the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. (Pen.
Code, § 188.) The jury could reasonably conclude from the
testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness that defendant shot
the deceased without the provocation necessary to make the
homicide manslaughter or the deliberation and premeditation
necessary to make it first-degree murder. Defendant's testimony of provocation served only to create a conflict in the
evidence. (People v. Wein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 398-399 [326 P.2d
457] ; People v. Brust, 47 Ca1.2d 776, 783 [306 P.2d 480] ;
People v. Pope, 130 Ca1.App.2d 321, 825 [279 P.2d 108].)
[a] Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing
to give the following instruction:
"The fact that a witness had been convicted of a felony,
if such be a fact, may be considered by you for only one
JJUrpose, namely, in jUdging the credibility of tllat witness.
The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or
impair the witness's credibility, and it does not raise a presumption that the witness has testified falsely. It is simply
one of the circumstances that you are to take into consideration
ill weighing the testimony of such a witness. "
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Th(' jury was instructed that it was for them alone to
judge the credibilit.y of the witneRReR ann the weight to be
given the evidencc offered; that every person is presumed
to spcak tIle trutll; and t11at a witness may be impeached by
inconsistent statements, by contradictory eyidence, or by
evidence that he has been convicted of a felony. These instructions correctly stated the law. Moreover, under the circumstances of the present case, the requested instruction
was incorrect. Defendant's convictions were not in t lJe
evidence •• for only one purpose, namely, in judging the
credibility of that witness." They were an essential element
in tbe cbarged violation of the Deadly Weapons Act. (Pen.
Code, § 12021.)
Defendant's most serious contention is that the court
erred in refusing to give the following instruction:
"You may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the
commission of which is necessarily included in that with
which he is charged, if, in your judgment, the evidence supports such a verdict under my instructions.
"To enable you to apply the foregoing instruction, if your
findings of fact require you to do so, I instruct you that the
offense of murder, of which the defendant is charged in
Count I of the indictment, necessarily includes the crime of
manslaughter.
"If you find that defendant was guilty of. an offense included within the charge of the indictment, but entertain a
reasonable doubt as to the degree of the crime of which he is
guilty, it is your duty to convict him only of the lesser
offense." (CALJIC [1946 ed.] Instructions Nos. 115-115A.)
'!'he jury was instructed on the elements of the crimes of
murder and manslaughter. The court explained that there
are two degrees of murder and that if the jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed the crime of murder but entertained a reasonable doubt
as to the degree, tbey should give defendant the benefit of
the doubt and find him guilty of second degree murder. Thc
jury was also instructed that if they were in doubt as to
whether the killing was manslaughter or justifiable homicitlt',
defendant was to be acquitted. Finally, the (,Ol11"t illstructed
the jury that defl."ndant was presumed innocent of any crime
uutil the contrary had been proved, and in case of reasonaule
doubt, was entitled to an acquittal, and that the prrsnmptioll
of innocence attaches at every stage of the case and to every
fact essential to a conviction.
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! Defendant contends that because the instructions on manslaughter were not accompanied with the further instruction
that ill the ca.<;e of a reasonable doubt as between second
degree murder and manslaughter, defendant was to be found
guilty of manslaughter, the jury was given the impression
that the rule requiring a finding of guilt of the lesser offense
applied only as between degrees of murder.
[3] It has been consistently held in this state since 1880
that when the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of
guilt of both the offense charged and a lesser included offense, the jury must be instructed that if they entertain a
reasonable doubt as to which offense has been committed, they
must find the defendant guilty only of the lesser offense.
(People v. lams, 57 Cal. 115, 121, 130; People v. Newcomer,
118 Cal. 263, 270-271 [50 P. 405] ; People v. MarslwU, 120
Cal. 70, 70-71 [52 P. 129] ; People v. Burl1s, 88 Cal.App.2d
867, 871~873 [200 P.2d 134] ; see also McAffee v. United Stotes,
105 F.2d 21, 31 [70 App.D.C. 142] ; People v. Marqu·is, 153
Cal.App.2d 553, 556-558 [315 P.2d 57] ; People v. Miller, 67
Cal.App. 674, 678-679 [228 P. 68] ; 20 A.L.R. 1258, 1259; 26
Am.Jur., Homicide, § 541.) The People contend, however,
that this rule is inconsistent with section 1097 of the Penal
Code, which provides that "Where it appears that the defendant has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable
ground of doubt of which of two or more degrees he is guilty,
he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only." They
contend that this section is limited on its face to degrees of
the same offense and that the proposed instruction is therefore
erroneous because murder and manslaughter are distinct
offenses.
[4] Section 1097 presupposes that the jury has concluded
tllUt the defendaut is guilty of some public offense embraced
within the pleadings but is in doubt as to the degree of the
offense proved. The question presented is whetJler the words
"offense" and "degrees" refer only to the specifically defined
degrees of a single offense, or refer to all the degrees of
criminality that may be involved in a criminal- act. Thus,
an unlawful killing may involve not only the two degrces
of murder, but also the included offense of manslaugllter.
·rhere is no rcason for not applying the general principle
of reasonable doubt 10 both sit nat jOJl~. Givt>l1 the owrriding
hasie }ll"in('iple of reasollable dOllLt, the admonition that tl1e
Pellal Code is to be intcrp.reted "with a view to effect its
objeC"ls and to promote justice" (Pen. Code, § 4), and t11e
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anomaly that would otherwise result, we ':;UJUl:llUUe
words "offense" and "degrees" in section 1097 "Af·";1':h-:~j·'~
th(' degrees of criminality involved in a criminal act.
"
Even if we were to conclude, however, that section
refers only to specifically defined degrees of single offenses' 1
~ivided into degrees, it would not follow. th~t the instruciiol1 ';j
IS erroneous. [5] In every case the prIncIple of reasonable"!
doubt requires an acquittal of an offense when the p~~!
cution has not met its burden of proof. [6] Thus, whe~fl.'j
reasonable doubt exists as between degrees of the samef)tJ~j
or as betwee~ the inclu~ive and included o1fense,the.·~pv~~
can only conVIct of the CrIme whose elements have been Pl1JY~t~
beyond a reasonable doubt. Narrowly constmed, section \109,'Ur
at most illustrates the application of the mle in the case 1i&~
crimes divided into degrees. It does not abrogate its • .P.E~
plication in other situations. (See Southern Calif. GtII'Cti,.1t.
v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 713,719-720 [329 P.2d 28~j;J~
City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 77 [I.~-i]
P.2d 289] ; Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Lon,g B~~
173 Cal. 765, 772-773 [161 P. 975].) Accordingly, unc1~1)
either interpretation, it aft'ords no basis for departing 'fro~]
the settled law. (People v.lams, supra, 57 Cal. 115, 121,180,~;
People v. Newcomer, supra, 118 Cal. 263, 270-271; People
Marshall, supra, 120 Cal. 70, 70-71; People v. Burns, .upra,i
88 Ca1.App.2d 867, 871-873; see also McAf!~e v. Unifed 8f~f~:~
supra, 105 F.2d 21, 31; People v. MarquJ.S, supra, 153 oat:;,:
App.2d 553, 556-558; People v. Miller, supra, 67 Cal-!--?P'it
674, 678-679; 20 A.L.R. 1258, 1259; 26 Am.Jur., HOID1Cl~~
§5 4 1 . ) ;
['1] The People cont.end, however, that the proposed, '. '
struction is erroneous in its statement of the mle of reasonable ~
doubt between second degree murder and manslaughter. They~~
object to the language that if you "entertain a reasonable \
doubt as to the degree of the crime of which he is guilty, it :
is your duty to convict him only of the lesser o1fense." They
point out that it is only murder that is divided into degrees
and contend that the jury would relate "degree of the crime"
to degrees of murder, "lesser o1fense" to manslaughter, and
conclude that under the proposed instmction doubt as to the
degree of murder would require a verdict of manslaughter.
The instmction caunot reasonably be construed to reach such
an obviou.~ly absul'u rellult. When read in context it is obvious that "degree of the crime" refers, not to degrees of
murder alone, but to degrees of criminal homicide including
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manslaughter, and that "ls<;pr offense" refers to thr. h~II.<;l'r
of the two df'.grees or criminal homicide bctwecn which tht~
doubt exists. It thus makes clear that the principle of reasonable doubt applies not only between first and second degree
murder but also between second degree murder and manj;h.!l1ght~r.

[8a] The failure of the trial court to instruct on the
effect of a reasonable doubt as between any of the included
offenses, when it had instructed as to the effect of such doubt
as between the two highest offenses, and as between the lowest
offense and justifiable homicide, left the instructions· with the
clearly erroneous implication that the rule requiring .a finding
of guilt of the lesser offense applied only as between first and
second degree murder. This case was a close one on its facts.
While there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction
of second degree murder, a finding that the offense was manslaughter would be equally warranted. [9] Even if the jury
disbelieved defendant's testimony that he did not intend to hit
Glover and concluded that the crime was not involuntary
manslaughter, it was still presented with substanti~l evidence
of provocation, much of which was undisputed, that would
support a finding of voluntary manslaughter. (See People v.
Keel, 91 Cal.App. 599, 604-606 [267 P. 161].) Glover had
taken defendant's money and only returned part of it, passing
the rest to his wife. Defendant could reasonably conclude
that Glover intended to steal his money, and he testified that
Glover made a menacing gesture toward him and told him
that if he did not shut up he would lose more than his money.
Defendant was entitled to have this evidence considered in
the light of the rule of reasonable doubt, not only on the issue
of self-defense, but also on the issue of provocation sufticient
to reduce the killing from second degree murder to manslaughter. The record demonstrates that the jury considered
the distinction between these offenses crucial and had difticulty
with it. Six hours after the case was submitted to them, they
returned to the courtroom and requested C Conce again tIle
legal interpretation of murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter," and again the defendant requested that
bis instruction be given, and again his request was denied.
The proposed instruction should have been given. It went
directly to the defense of reasonable doubt of defendant's
guilt of second degree murder; it was clearly responsive to an
issue raised by the evidence (People v. Oar'TIi'TIe, 41 CaL2d 384,
389-390 [260 P.2d 16] ; People v. Hudson, 45 Ca1.2d 121, 126
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[287 P.2d 497]) ; and it was essential to cure the misleading
effect of its absence in the light of the other instructions
given. [8b] Under these circumstances there exists "such
an equal balance of reasonable probabilities as to leave the
court in serious doubt as to whether the error has affected the
result," and accordingly the error is prejudicial. (People v.
Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 837 [299 P.2d 243].) The error did
not, however, have any bearing on defendant's conviction of
violating Penal Code, section 12021.
!
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are re- \
versed as to count one charging murder. In all other respects:
they are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
McCOMB, Concurring and Dissenting.-I would affirm the
judgment for the reasons stated by Mr. Presiding Justice
Kaufman in the opinion prepared by him for the District
Court of Appeal in People v. Dewber'll (Cal.App.), 327 P.
2d 616.
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